In this paper, we propose a single-agent logic of goal-directed knowing how extending the standard epistemic logic of knowing that with a new knowing how operator. The semantics of the new operator is based on the idea that knowing how to achieve φ means that there exists a (uniform) strategy such that the agent knows that it can make sure φ. We give an intuitive axiomatization of our logic and prove the soundness, completeness and decidability of the logic. The crucial axioms relating knowing that and knowing how illustrate our understanding of knowing how in this setting. This logic can be used in representing both knowledgethat and knowledge-how.
Introduction
Standard epistemic logic focuses on reasoning about propositional knowledge expressed by knowing that φ [Hintikka, 1962] . However, in natural language, various other knowledge expressions are also frequently used, such as knowing what, knowing how, knowing why, and so on.
In particular, knowing how receives much attention in both philosophy and AI. Epistemologists debate about whether knowledge-how is also propositional knowledge [Fantl, 2008] , e.g., whether knowing how to swim can be rephrased using knowing that. In AI, it is crucial to let autonomous agents know how to fulfill certain goals in robotics, game playing, decision making, and multi-agent systems. In fact, a large body of AI planning can be viewed as finding algorithms to let the autonomous planner know how to achieve some propositional goals, i.e., to obtain goaldirected knowledge-how [Gochet, 2013] . Here, both propositional knowledge and knowledge-how matter, especially in the planning problems where initial uncertainty and nondeterministic actions are present. From a logician's point of view, it is interesting to see how knowing how interact with knowing that, and how they differ in their reasoning patterns. A logic of knowing how also helps us to find a consistency notion regarding knowledge database with knowing how expressions. * How to formalize the knowledge-how of the agent in such scenarios with uncertainty?
Already since the early days of AI, people have been looking at it in the setting of logics of knowledge and action [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; McCarthy, 1979; Moore, 1985; Lespérance et al., 2000; van der Hoek et al., 2000] . However, there has been no consensus on how to capture the logic of "knowing how" formally (cf. the recent surveys [Gochet, 2013] and [Ågotnes et al., 2015] ). The difficulties are well discussed in [Jamroga andÅgotnes, 2007] and [Herzig, 2015] and simply combining the existing modalities for "knowing that" and "ability" in a logical language like ATEL [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003] does not lead to a genuine notion of "knowing how", e.g., knowing how to achieve p is not equivalent to knowing that there exists a strategy to make sure p. It does not work even when we replace the strategy by uniform strategy where the agent has to choose the same action on indistinguishable states [Jamroga andÅgotnes, 2007] . Let φ(x) express that x is a way to make sure some goal is achieved, and let K be the standard knowledge-that modality. There is a crucial distinction between the de dicto reading of knowing how (K∃xφ(x)) and the desired de re reading (∃xKφ(x)) endorsed also by linguists and philosophers [Stanley and Williamson, 2001] . The latter implies the former, but not the other way round. For example, consider a variant of Example 1.1 where no test is available: then the doctor has de dicto knowledge-how to cure, but not the de re one. Proposals to capture the de re reading have been discussed in the literature, such as making the knowledge operator more constructive [Jamroga andÅgotnes, 2007] , making the strategy explicitly specified [Herzig et al., 2013; Belardinelli, 2014] , or inserting K in-between an existential quantifier and the ability modality in see-to-that-it (STIT) logic [Broersen and Herzig, 2015] .
In [Wang, 2015; Wang, 2016b] , a new approach is proposed by introducing a single new modality Kh of (conditional) goal-directed knowing how, instead of breaking it down into other modalities. This approach is in line with other de re treatments of non-standard epistemic logics of knowing whether, knowing what and so on (cf. [Wang, 2016a] for a survey). The semantics of Kh is inspired by the idea of conformant planning based on linear plans [Smith and Weld, 1998; Yu et al., 2016] . It is shown that Kh is not a normal modality, e.g, knowing how to get drunk and knowing how to drive does not entail knowing how to drive when drunk. The work is generalized further in [Li and Wang, 2017; Li, 2017] . However, in these previous works, there was no explicit knowing that modality K in the language and the semantics of Kh is based on linear plans, which does not capture the broader notion allowing branching plans or strategies that are essential in the scenarios like Example 1.1.
In this paper, we extend this line of work largely in the following aspects:
• Both the knowing how modality Kh and knowing that modality K are in the language.
• In contrast to the state-independent semantics [Wang, 2015; Wang, 2016b] , we interpret Kh locally w.r.t. the current uncertainty.
• Instead of linear plans in [Wang, 2015] , the semantics of our Kh operator is based on strategies (branching plans). The intuitive idea behind our semantics of Kh is that the agent knows how to achieve φ iff (s)he has an executable uniform strategy σ such that the agent knows that:
• σ guarantees φ in the end given the uncertainty;
• σ always terminates after finitely many steps. Note that for an agent to know how to make sure φ, it is not enough to find a plan which works de facto, but the agent should know it works in the end. This is a strong requirement inspired by planning under uncertainty, where the collection of final possible outcomes after executing the plan is required to be a subset of the collection of the goal states [Geffner and Bonet, 2013] .
Technically, our contributions are summarized as follows:
• A logical language with both Kh and K operators with a semantics which fleshes out formally the above intuitions about knowing how.
• A complete axiomatization with intuitive axioms.
• Decidability of our logic.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the language and semantics of our framework; Section 3 proposes the axiomatization and proves its soundness; We prove the completeness of our proof system and show the decidability of the logic in Section 4 before we conclude with future work.
Language and Semantics
Let PROP be a countable set of propositional symbols. Definition 2.1 (Language). The language is defined by the following BNF where p ∈ PROP:
We use ⊥, ∨, → as usual abbreviations and writeK for ¬K¬.
• W is a non-empty set,
• ACT is a set of actions,
is a binary relation on W , and
Note that the labels in ACT do not appear in the language. The graph in Example 1.1 represents a model with omitted self-loops of ∼ (dotted lines), and the equivalence classes induced by ∼ are {s 1 , s 2 }, {s 3 }, {s 4 }, {s 5 }, {s 6 }. In this paper we do not require any properties between ∼ and a − → to lay out the most general framework. We will come back to particular assumptions like perfect recall at the end of the paper. Given a model and a state s, if there exists t such that s a − → t, we say that a is executable at s. Also note that the actions can be non-deterministic. For each s ∈ W , we use [s] to denote the equivalence class {t ∈ W | s ∼ t}, and use [W ] to denote the collection of all the equivalence classes on W w.r.t. ∼.
Definition 2.3 (Strategies). Given a model, a (uniformly executable) strategy is a partial function
Particularly, the empty function is also a strategy, the empty strategy.
Note that the executability is as crucial as uniformity, without which the knowledge-how may be trivialized. We use dom(σ) to denote the domain of σ. Function σ can be seen as a binary relation such that 
If the execution is a finite sequence
this execution. If it is infinite, then all
We use CELeaf(σ, s) to denote the set of all leaf-nodes of all the σ's complete executions (can be many due to non-determinism) starting from [s], and CEInner(σ, s) to denote the set of all the inner-nodes of σ's complete executions starting from [s] .
is a leaf-node of a complete execution then σ is not defined at [s]. Definition 2.5 (Semantics). Given a pointed model M, s, the satisfaction relation is defined as follows: Note that the two conditions for σ in the semantics of Kh reflect our two intuitions mentioned in the introduction. The implicit role of K in Kh will become more clear when the axioms are presented. Going back to Example 1.1, we can verify that Kh¬p holds on s 1 and s 2 due to the strategy σ = {{s 1 , s 2 } → test, {s 3 } → pills, {s 4 } → surgery}. Note that CELeaf(σ, s) = {[s 5 ], [s 6 ]} = {{s 5 }, {s 6 }} and ¬p = {s 5 , s 6 }. On the other hand, Kh¬q is not true on s 1 : although the agent can guarantee ¬q de facto on s 1 by taking a strategy such that {s 1 , s 2 } → test and {s 3 } → pills, he cannot know it beforehand since nothing works at s 2 to make sure ¬q. Readers may also verify that Kh(p ↔ q) holds at s 1 and s 2 (hint: a strategy is a partial function).
Axiomatization

The proof system
System SKH Axioms TAUT all axioms of propositional logic
Note that we have S5 axioms for K. AxKtoKh says if p is known then you know how to achieve p by doing nothing (we allow the empty strategy). AxKhtoKhK reflects the first condition in the semantics that the goal is known after the executions. We will come back to this axiom at the end of the paper. Note that the termination condition is not fully expressible in our language but AxKhbot captures part of it by ruling out strategies that have no terminating executions at all. AxKhKh essentially says that the strategies can be composed. Its validity is quite involved, to which we devote the next subsection. Finally, AxKhtoKKh is the positive introspection axiom for Kh, whose validity is due to uniformity of the strategies on indistinguishable states. The corresponding negative introspection can be derived by using AxKhtoKKh, 5 and T:
Proposition 3.1. ⊢ ¬Khp → K¬Khp.
Proof.
(
Note that we do not have the K axiom for Kh. Instead, we have the monotonicity rule MONOKh. In fact, the logic is not normal, as desired, e.g., Khp ∧ Khq → Kh(p ∧ q) is not valid: the existence of two different strategies for different goals does not imply the existence of a unified strategy to realize both goals.
Validity of AxKhKh
AxKhKh is about the "sequential" compositionality of strategies. Suppose on some pointed model there is a strategy σ to guarantee that we end up with the states where on each s of them we have some other strategy σ s to make sure p (KhKhp). Since the strategies are uniform, we only need to consider some σ [s] for each [s] . Now to validate AxKhKh, we need to design a unified strategy to compose σ and those σ [s] into one strategy to still guarantee p (Khp). The general idea is actually simple: first ordering those leafnodes [s] (using Axiom of Choice); then by transfinite induction adjust σ [s] one by one to make sure these strategies can fit together as a unified strategy θ; finally, merge the relevant part of σ with θ into the desired strategy. We make this idea precise below. First we need an observation: According to well-ordering theorem (equivalent to Axiom of Choice), we assume CELeaf(σ, s) = {S i | i < γ} where γ is an ordinal number and γ ≥ 1. Let s i be an element in Step I. By induction on i, we will define a set of strategies τ i where 0 ≤ i < γ. Let f i = β<i τ β and
• τ 0 = σ 0 | CEInner(σ0,s0) ;
Claim 3.3.1. We have the following results:
Proof of claim 3.3.1: 1. It is obvious. 2. We prove it by induction on i. For the case of i = 0, it is obvious. For the case of i = α > 0, it follows by the IH that τ β is a partial function for each β < α. Furthermore, it follows by 1. that τ β1 ⊆ τ β2 for all β 1 < β 2 < α. Thus, we have f α = β<α τ β is a partial function. Since σ α is a partial function, in order to show τ α is a partial function, we only need to show that
3. We prove it by induction on i. It is obvious for the case of i = 0. For the case of i = α > 0, given j < α and t ∈ dom(τ j ), we need to show that dom(
4. We prove it by induction on i. For the case of i = 0, due to dom(τ 0 ) = CEInner(σ 0 , s 0 ), it follows that there is a
For the case of i = α > 0, there are two situations:
∈ dom(τ β ) for some β < α. By 3, we have dom(τ α )∩CELeaf(τ β , t) = ∅. Since δ is a τ α 's complete execution, it follows by Proposition 3.2 that δ is also a τ β 's complete execution from [t] . It follows by the IH that |δ| = n for some n ∈ N and [t n ] ⊆ φ . If [t] ∈ D α , there are two cases: there exist k < |δ| and β < α s.t. [t k ] ∈ dom(τ β ), or there do not exist such k and β. (Please note that |δ| > 1 due to the fact that δ
-[t k ] ∈ dom(τ β ) for some k < |δ| and some β < α:
Therefore, |δ| = k + n. -If there do not exist k < |δ| and β < α s.t.
[
It follows that µ is σ α 's possible execution from s α . By (◭), all σ α 's complete executions from s α are finite. Thus, µ is finite. There-
We continue to show that
is a τ α 's complete execution from t and it is also a σ α 's possible execution from t, there are two cases:
Otherwise, there are two cases:
Step II. We define τ γ = i<γ τ i . It follows by 1. and 2. of Claim 3.3.1 that τ γ is indeed a partial function. Then we prove the following claim. 
It cannot be that j ≤ i. Otherwise, µ is not τ i 's complete execution since τ j ⊆ τ i by 1. of Claim 3.3.1. Thus, we have j > i. Since we also have that [t n ] ∈ dom(τ j ), [t n ] ∈ CELeaf(τ i , t) and t ∈ dom(τ i ), this is contradictory with 3. of Claim 3.3.1. Therefore, we have δ = µ.
Step III. We define
and σ is the strategy mentioned at ( * ). Since both τ γ and σ| C are partial functions, τ is also a partial function. We then prove the following claim.
Proof of claim 3.3.3: Since dom(τ ) = dom(τ γ ) ∪ C, there are two cases:
, it follows that CELeaf(τ γ , t) ∩ C = ∅. Moreover, we have CELeaf(τ γ , t) ∩ dom(τ γ ) = ∅. Thus, we have CELeaf(τ γ , t) ∩ dom(τ ) = ∅. It follows by Proposition 3.2 that δ is a τ γ 's complete execution from from [t] . It follows by Claim 3.3.2 |δ| = n for some n ∈ N and [t n ] ⊆ φ If [t] ∈ C, there are two cases: there exists k < |δ| such that [t k ] ∈ dom(τ γ ), or there does not exists such k. (Please note that |δ| > 1 due to the fact that δ = [t 0 ] · · · is τ 's complete execution from [t] ∈ dom(τ )).
•
It follows by Proposition 3.2 that µ is a τ γ 's complete execution from [t k ]. It follows by Claim 3.3.2 that µ = [t k ] · · · [t k+n ] for some n ∈ N and [t k+n ] ⊆ φ . Therefore, |δ| = k + n.
• If there does not exist k < |δ| s.t.
It follows that µ is σ's possible execution from s. By ( * ), all σ's complete executions from s are finite. Thus, µ is finite. Therefore,
is a τ 's complete execution from t and it is also a σ's possible execution from t, there are two cases: 
Completeness and Decidability
Let Φ be a subformula-closed set of formulas. It is obvious that Φ is countable since the whole language itself is countable. Given a set of formulas ∆, let: ∆| K = {Kφ | Kφ ∈ ∆}, ∆| ¬K = {¬Kφ | ¬Kφ ∈ ∆}, ∆| Kh = {Khφ | Khφ ∈ ∆}, ∆| ¬Kh = {¬Khφ | ¬Khφ ∈ ∆}. Below we define the closure of Φ, and use it to build a canonical model w.r.t. Φ. We will show that when Φ is finite then we can build a finite model. Definition 4.1. cl(Φ) is defined as:
Note that if Φ is the whole language then an atom is simply a maximal consistent set. By a standard inductive construction, we can obtain the Lindenbaum-like result in our setting (which is useful to show the existence lemma for K): Proposition 4.3. Let ∆ be an atom of cl(Φ), Γ ⊆ ∆ and φ ∈ cl(Φ). If Γ ∪ {±φ} is consistent then there is an atom ∆ ′ of cl(Φ) such that (Γ ∪ {±φ}) ⊆ ∆ ′ , where ±φ = φ or ±φ = ¬φ.
Proof. Let Γ = {φ k | k ∈ N}. Since ∆ is an atom and Γ ⊆ ∆, it follows that there is a set Γ ′ = {χ k ∈ cl(Φ) | k ∈ N} such that φ k = χ k or φ k = ¬χ k for all k ∈ N. Let ψ 1 , · · · , ψ n , · · · be all the formulas in cl(Φ) \ Γ ′ \ {φ}. We define Γ i as below.
Firstly, we will show Γ i is consistent for all i ∈ N. Since Γ 0 is consistent, we only need to show that if Γ i is consistent then Γ i+1 is consistent, i.e. either Γ i ∪ {ψ i } or Γ i ∪ {¬ψ i } is consistent. Assuming both Γ i ∪ {ψ i } and Γ i ∪ {¬ψ i } are not consistent, it follows that Γ i ⊢ ¬ψ i and Γ i ⊢ ψ i . That is, Γ i is inconsistent. Contradiction. Therefore, either Γ i ∪ {ψ i } or Γ i ∪ {¬ψ i } is consistent.
Let ∆ ′ = i∈N Γ i . It follows that ∆ ′ is consistent. It is obvious that either ψ ∈ ∆ ′ or ¬ψ ∈ ∆ ′ for all ψ ∈ cl(Φ). Therefore, ∆ ′ is an atom of cl(Φ). • ACT = {φ | Khφ ∈ Φ};
• for each φ ∈ ACT, ∆ φ − → ∆ ′ iff Khφ, ¬Kφ ∈ ∆ and Kφ ∈ ∆ ′ ;
• for each p ∈ Φ, p ∈ V (∆) iff p ∈ ∆.
Note that we use formulas that the agent knows how to achieve as the action labels, and we introduce an action transition if it is necessary, i.e., Khφ but ¬Kφ (empty strategy does not work). Requiring Kφ ∈ ∆ ′ is to reflect the first condition in the semantics of Kh. Using NECK, DISTK and Proposition 4.3, it is routine to show the existence lemma for K: Since the epistemic operator K is distributive over ∧ and ⊢ KKφ i ↔ Kφ i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ⊢ K¬Kψ i ↔ ¬Kψ i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
